By A.J. Keilty, President, KEILTY Realty Management
Yes, on a question of law, within 30 days, and to a court rather than back to the Board. Section 210 (1) of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 gives any person affected by an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board a right of appeal to the Divisional Court. It is not a second hearing, it will not fix a finding of fact you disagree with, and it is a different thing from the review the Board can do itself. The two run on different clocks from different triggers, and on a single order there can be four deadlines running at once.
The short version.
We set out the review route in full in what you can do if you disagree with an LTB order. This page is the other half: what happens once you leave the Board and go to court. Here is the machinery, the arithmetic, and the three places the Board's own published wording does not match the Act.
Only if what went wrong is a legal error, and even then it is not the only route that reaches one.
Section 209 (1) sets the starting position: "Except where this Act provides otherwise, and subject to section 21.2 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, an order of the Board is final and binding." Keep both opening qualifiers, because they are what make anything else on this page possible. The Act provides otherwise in section 210, and section 21.2 of the other Act is where the Board's power to review its own order comes from.
Interpretation Guideline 8, Review of an Order, dated 2026-07-01, draws the line between the two in one sentence: "A review is not an appeal or an opportunity to change the way a case was presented. It is a discretionary process to allow parties to challenge a final LTB order in specific circumstances". Read that from the other side and you have the shape of an appeal. It is not discretionary, it is not confined to prescribed circumstances, and it is not decided by the Board. What it is confined to is a question of law.
Here is the part that is easy to get backwards, and it decides which window you should be counting. A legal error is not the exclusive property of the court route. Section 1 (3) of O. Reg. 178/26 lists the serious errors that ground a review at the Board, and paragraph 2 of that subsection reads, in full: "The Board made an error of law, fact or mixed fact and law." So a misapplied legal test can be put to the Board for $58 as well as to the court for $243, and the review reaches findings of fact and mixed questions, which section 210 (1) does not.
Two qualifiers on that, both on the face of the regulation. The gateway is paragraph 2 of section 1 (1), which requires that "The decision or order is the consequence of a serious error listed in subsection (3)", so the error has to have driven the result rather than merely be present in the reasons. And the Board "determines" whether the circumstance applies, so the door is discretionary at the threshold. An error of law is a review ground; it is not an entitlement to a review.
The practical consequence is that if the Member misread a section of the Act, applied the wrong test, or decided something they had no jurisdiction to decide, you have two live routes and the shorter clock belongs to the cheaper one. If the Member believed the tenant's evidence rather than yours, section 210 (1) does not reach it at all, and the review is the only one of the two that does. Getting that diagnosis wrong costs you the window on the route that would have worked.
A wider group than you might expect, on a narrower ground than you might hope.
Section 210 (1) reads, in full: "Any person affected by an order of the Board may appeal the order to the Divisional Court within 30 days after being given the order, but only on a question of law."
Note the opening words. It is any person affected by the order, not any party to the application. Somebody who was never named but whose position the order changes is within the wording. Note also the closing words, which are the whole limit: "but only on a question of law". There is no leave requirement, so an appeal on that ground is available as of right, and there is no threshold amount.
The Act does not define a question of law. The Board's brochure Amendments, Reviews and Appeals, last updated July 2026, offers a working description: "An error in law can include when the LTB Member incorrectly interprets or applies the Residential Tenancies Act or some other legal test that is important to the decision." Read the word "include", because that is an open list rather than a definition, and read "important to the decision", because an error that made no difference to the result is a poor foundation for an appeal.
One provision sits behind arguments about defects in the paperwork, and it is worth knowing before you build one. Section 212 (1) says "Substantial compliance with this Act respecting the contents of forms, notices or documents is sufficient", and section 212 (2), added in 2024 and in force 2024-12-04, adds that an error in contents "still constitutes substantial compliance with this Act, as long as the error does not significantly prejudice a party's ability to participate in a proceeding under this Act". A paperwork imperfection is not by itself a question of law, and section 212 is the reason.
On the Act, the day you are given the order. On two of the Board's own pages, something else each time. Those are not the same day, and the difference is yours to carry.
Section 210 (1) says "within 30 days after being given the order". The Amendments, Reviews and Appeals brochure says: "The deadline to appeal an LTB order to the Divisional Court is 30 days after the LTB makes the order." An order made on a Wednesday and received the following Tuesday produces two different deadlines depending on which of those you follow, and the later one is the one the statute gives you.
There is a third version, and it is the one an owner is likeliest to meet first, because it sits on the Board's Application and hearing process page under the heading "Appealing an order". It reads: "An Appeal to Divisional Court must be filed within 30 days of the date the review order was issued." That is neither the Act's trigger nor the brochure's. It counts from a review order, which on a file where nobody requested a review does not exist, and it says filed where the Rules of Civil Procedure say served. Three published statements of one deadline, and only the statute is the law.
While you are on that page, treat the rest of it with the same care. It carries two separate headings both titled "Asking the LTB to review an order", and they give different deadlines: one says 30 days from the date of the order, the other says 15 days. The 15 day block is the one that matches section 209 (3) and the current regulation-based grounds. The page prints no revision date on its face.
We are not going to tell you to rely on the statute and ignore the publisher, because the consequence of being wrong is that you have no appeal. What we will say is which is which. Section 210 (1) is the law and the Board's pages are plain-language summaries of it, and where a summary and a statute diverge the statute governs. The safe course is to work the earliest date any of them produces, and treat the statutory date as the margin you hope not to need. If you are close to any of them, that is the point to get advice rather than to reason it out from a webpage.
The brochure does add the escape, and it is worth having: "If the 30-day deadline has passed, you can bring a motion to the Divisional Court requesting an extension of time." That motion is to the court and not to the Board, and there is nobody at the Board who can extend a deadline the Act gives you for going somewhere else. Be careful with the authority for it, though, because the obvious rule does not quite reach. Rule 3.02 (3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an order extending or abridging "a time prescribed by these rules and relating to an appeal to an appellate court may be made only by a judge of the appellate court". The 30 days here is prescribed by section 210 (1) of the Act rather than by the Rules, so Rule 3.02 (3) tells you where an extension motion of that kind is heard without itself being the power to extend a statutory period. This is a point to take advice on rather than to work out from a webpage, and the shorter answer is not to need it.
Thirty days, fifteen days, thirty days and thirty days, running from four different events. Work them on a Cornwall file. The Board issues an order on Wednesday 2026-10-07 and you are given it on Tuesday 2026-10-13.
Four routes, three of them thirty days, and those three produce only two distinct dates, because two of them count from issuance and one counts from delivery. The amendment and the judicial review both close on 2026-11-06 while the appeal runs on to 2026-11-12, and the review, which is the shortest, has already closed a fortnight before any of them. That is the point of the whole exercise. The number of days tells you nothing until you know what it counts from.
One frank caveat on the fourth of those. "Made or occurred" is not the same phrase as either "issuance" or "being given", and neither the Act nor the regulation tells you which event it picks up on a Board order. We have read it as the date the order was made because that is the ordinary sense of the words and it produces the earlier date. That is our reading rather than something the statute settles, and the direction of the risk is why we take the earlier one.
Section 209 (3) carries its own relief, and it is the Board's to give: the 15 days applies "unless the Board considers it just and appropriate in the circumstances to extend the time to request the review". Section 5 (2) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act carries the equivalent for judicial review, and it is conditional on two things, that the court "is satisfied that there are apparent grounds for relief and that no substantial prejudice or hardship will result to any person affected by reason of the delay".
Under the court's rules, and not under the Board's. This is the trap on the arithmetic above.
The Board's Rules of Procedure set a counting convention at Rules 1.12 to 1.15, and Rule 1.16 says those may not be waived or varied. They govern the Board's own time limits, which is why they reach the 15 day review request and the 30 day amendment request and stop there. An appeal is a court filing and it is counted under Rule 3.01 (1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which opens "In the computation of time under these rules or an order, except where a contrary intention appears".
Two things in that rule change the answer from what a reader used to the Board would expect.
So on a court deadline you count every day and check only the last one. Both of the court dates in the section above, Thursday 2026-11-12 for the appeal and Friday 2026-11-06 for the judicial review, are ordinary weekdays and neither moves.
One caution before you carry that counting rule anywhere else. Rule 3.01 (1) is expressed to govern time "under these rules or an order", so it does not reach a limitation period set by a statute. The 30 days for a judicial review application is set by section 5 (1) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, and it is counted under the Legislation Act, 2006 instead, where the holiday list in section 88 (2) does not include Saturday. Two counting regimes on one subject, and we set the statutory one out in whether you can apply for judicial review of an LTB order in Ontario.
One further point about which 30 days is which. Rule 61.04 (1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure sets a general 30 days for serving a notice of appeal, running "after the making of the order appealed from", but it does so expressly "unless a statute or these rules provide otherwise". Section 210 (1) is such a statute. The two periods happen to be the same length and they are not the same period, because the Rule runs from the making of the order and the Act runs from your being given it.
Two more deadlines, and the first of them is the one that catches people, because the 30 days is not a deadline to file.
Rule 61.04 (1) provides that an appeal to an appellate court "shall be commenced by serving a notice of appeal in Form 61A.2 (Court of Appeal) or 61A.3 (Divisional Court) together with the certificate required by subrule 61.05 (1)", within the 30 days, on every party whose interest may be affected and on any person entitled by statute to be heard. Read the verb. The act that commences the appeal is serving, and what you serve is a notice of appeal and a certificate respecting evidence. An owner who walks a notice of appeal into the court counter on day thirty without having served it has not commenced an appeal.
Then Rule 61.04 (4): "The notice of appeal, with proof of service, shall be filed in accordance with subrule 4.05 (4) (leaving in or mailing to court office) in the Registrar's office within ten days after service." Ten days from service, and proof of service goes in with it.
Then Rule 61.09 (1). The appellant perfects the appeal "by complying with subrules (2) and (3)", which is to say by filing the appeal book, the transcripts where there are any, the exhibit book and the factum, and the deadline splits: "(a) where no transcript of evidence is required for the appeal, within thirty days after filing the notice of appeal; or (b) where a transcript of evidence is required for the appeal, within 60 days after receiving notice that the evidence has been transcribed." Note where clause (b) counts from. It is the notice that the evidence has been transcribed, not the day the transcript reaches you.
Set against the Cornwall order above, that is service by Thursday 2026-11-12. Ten days from service runs to Sunday 2026-11-22, and this is the one place on the page where clause (c) of Rule 3.01 (1) does some work: the expiry falls on a holiday, so filing may be done on Monday 2026-11-23. Thirty days from that gives perfection, on the no-transcript branch, by Wednesday 2026-12-23. The $645 perfection fee falls due at the end of that chain rather than at the start, which is worth knowing when you are budgeting the decision rather than the filing.
Yes by default, and the provision that does it is not in the Act at all. Whether it stops a sheriff is a further step again.
Start with why another statute reaches a Board order in the first place, because it is one line and it is easy to skip. Section 184 (1) of the Act says: "The Statutory Powers Procedure Act applies with respect to all proceedings before the Board." Section 184 has two further subsections, both captioned Exception. Subsection (2) switches off subsection 5.1 (2) of that Act for an application under section 132 or 133, or an application solely under paragraph 1 of subsection 126 (1), and subsection (3) switches off subsection 5.1 (3) for an application under section 126, 132 or 133. Neither reaches anything on this page.
Section 210 contains no stay. We searched the whole of sections 209 to 212 for the words stay and suspend and neither appears anywhere in them. The stay comes from section 25 (1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act: "An appeal from a decision of a tribunal to a court or other appellate body operates as a stay in the matter unless, (a) another Act or a regulation that applies to the proceeding expressly provides to the contrary; or (b) the tribunal or the court or other appellate body orders otherwise."
Carry both exceptions, because the Board's brochure does not. Its wording is "An appeal to the Divisional Court automatically stays the LTB's order until the court makes a decision on the appeal. In some cases, the court may order the stay lifted before making a final decision." That picks up half of exception (b) and drops the rest. On the statute, the tribunal can order otherwise as well as the court, and a contrary provision in another Act or regulation displaces the stay entirely, provided it does so expressly. The stay is the default rather than an absolute, and it is worth knowing which of those you are relying on before you tell a tenant an eviction is off.
The Board reads the stay as reaching its own hands. The instructions to the Request to Review an Order, last updated July 2026, say: "If the order you want reviewed has been appealed to the Divisional Court, the order is automatically stayed and the LTB cannot consider your Request to Review an Order unless it first decides to lift the stay of the appeal." So an appeal does not merely pause enforcement. On the Board's own reading it pauses the Board.
There is a second and more specific stay, and it sits in the Rules of Civil Procedure rather than in either statute. Rule 63.01 (3) provides that the delivery of a notice of appeal from an interlocutory or final order made under the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 stays, until the disposition of the appeal, any provision of the order "(a) declaring a tenancy agreement terminated or evicting a person; or (b) terminating a member's occupancy of a member unit in a non-profit housing co-operative and evicting the member." Note the trigger, which is delivery rather than filing, and note the words "tenancy agreement" rather than tenancy. Note also what it leaves out. A money provision in the same order, for arrears say, is within neither clause, and would be caught if at all by Rule 63.01 (1), which stays a provision of an order "for the payment of money". Rule 63.01 (5) lets a judge of the court to which the appeal is taken order, "on such terms as are just", that the stay "does not apply".
Then the step that decides whether any of this stops an eviction on the ground, and it is the one we had not previously set out on this page. An automatic stay is not the same thing as enforcement stopping by itself, because what binds a sheriff is a document somebody has to go and get. Rule 63.03 (1) states the general position, that where an order is stayed "no steps may be taken under the order or for its enforcement", except by order of a judge or as provided in subrules (2) and (3). Rule 63.03 (3) is one of those exceptions and both halves of it matter: a stay "does not prevent the issue of a writ of execution or the filing of the writ in a sheriff's office or land registry office, but no instruction or direction to enforce the writ shall be given to a sheriff while the stay remains in effect." So the writ can exist while the stay does. What cannot happen is an instruction to act on it.
Rule 63.03 (5.1) is the provision written for this Board. If an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board is stayed under subsection 25 (1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, the registrar of the court to which the appeal has been taken "shall issue, on requisition by a party to the appeal, a certificate of stay (Form 63B) and, when the certificate has been filed with the sheriff, the sheriff shall not commence or continue enforcement of the order until satisfied that the stay is no longer in effect." Read the conditions in that sentence. The certificate issues on requisition, so somebody has to ask for it. The prohibition on the sheriff attaches once the certificate has been filed with the sheriff. And it lifts when the sheriff is satisfied the stay has ended, which is a second condition rather than an automatic expiry. Rule 63.03 (5.2) requires the requisition to state "that there is no order of the Landlord and Tenant Board that would prevent the automatic stay pending appeal". Note that the rule carries two certificates rather than one: Rule 63.03 (4) prescribes Form 63A as the general certificate of stay, issued on requisition where an order is stayed, and Rule 63.03 (5.1) prescribes Form 63B as the one written for a stayed Landlord and Tenant Board order. The practical course on an appeal is to requisition the certificate and file it, rather than to rely on the stay being evident to everybody who might act on the order.
A separate application to the same court on a different footing, and the absence of the stay is stated expressly rather than left to be inferred. What follows is the short version. We set the route out in full, including the Rule 68 timetable, what goes into the record and the factum, the two ways it can be dismissed for delay, and the appeal that lies from a Divisional Court decision, in whether you can apply for judicial review of an LTB order in Ontario.
Section 25 (2) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act reads: "An application for judicial review under the Judicial Review Procedure Act, or the bringing of proceedings specified in subsection 2 (1) of that Act is not an appeal within the meaning of subsection (1)." Subsection (1) is the automatic stay. So judicial review is carved out of it by name. Rule 63 does not reach it either: every automatic stay in Rule 63.01 is keyed to the delivery of a notice of appeal, Rule 63.03 (5.1) requires a court "to which an appeal has been taken", and the word application does not appear anywhere in Rule 63.
Nor does the Judicial Review Procedure Act supply one of its own. We searched the whole Act for the word stay and it does not appear once. What it does give you is section 4: "On an application for judicial review, the court may make such interim order as it considers proper pending the final determination of the application." That is a discretionary order you have to go and ask for, on notice, and it is the practical difference between the two routes. An appeal buys you time on filing. Judicial review buys you a motion.
The route itself is section 2 (1), and its opening words matter: "On an application by way of originating notice, which may be styled “Notice of Application for Judicial Review”, the court may, despite any right of appeal, by order grant any relief that the applicant would be entitled to" in proceedings for mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, or for a declaration or injunction about a statutory power. So the existence of the section 210 appeal does not shut judicial review out.
Two further subsections explain why somebody would take a route with no automatic stay, and they are the answer to what to do about a finding of fact. Section 2 (2) extends the court's power "to set aside a decision for error of law on the face of the record on an application for an order in the nature of certiorari" so that it applies on a judicial review of any decision made under a statutory power of decision, and it closes with a limit worth keeping: "to the extent it is not limited or precluded by the Act conferring such power of decision". Section 2 (3) is the one that reaches the facts. Where a tribunal's findings of fact are required by statute or law "to be based exclusively on evidence admissible before it and on facts of which it may take notice and there is no such evidence and there are no such facts to support findings of fact made by the tribunal", the court "may set aside the decision on an application for judicial review".
Read section 2 (3) narrowly, because it is drafted narrowly. It is a no-evidence rule, not a weight or reasonableness rule. A finding that is thin, or that you are confident is wrong, is outside it; there has to be no admissible evidence and no noticeable facts at all. It also carries a predicate, that the findings were legally required to rest exclusively on such evidence, and the remedy is discretionary and operates on the decision rather than on the finding. Section 2 (5) reinforces that, providing without condition that "The court may refuse to grant any relief on an application for judicial review", and section 3 lets the court refuse relief where the sole ground is "a defect in form or a technical irregularity" and no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred. Frankly, the summary is that judicial review gives an express statutory no-evidence route that section 210 does not spell out, and not a way to argue the facts again.
And the limitation period is the trap on this route, because it was only added in 2020 and anything written before then says the opposite. Section 5 (1) requires the application to be made "no later than 30 days after the date the decision or matter for which judicial review is being sought was made or occurred", opening with "Unless another Act provides otherwise" and closing "subject to subsection (2)", which is the extension power. That subsection was added by the Smarter and Stronger Justice Act, 2020 and came into force 2020-07-08. Material written before that date says there is no limitation period on judicial review in Ontario, and on this point it is out of date. Section 5 (3) is worth reading alongside it, because it extends the court's extension power to "any limitation of time for the bringing of an application for judicial review under any other Act, unless that Act expressly provides otherwise."
The Divisional Court, which is not a separate court, and three judges unless something unusual happens.
Section 18 (1) of the Courts of Justice Act continues the Divisional Court as "The branch of the Superior Court of Justice known as the Divisional Court", and section 18 (3) makes every judge of the Superior Court also a judge of it. Section 21 (1) is the default: "A proceeding in the Divisional Court shall be heard and determined by three judges sitting together." Section 21 (2) sets out three exceptions, and the one that might occur to an owner in a hurry is not a choice you get to make: clause (c) covers a proceeding that "is in a matter or class of matters that the Chief Justice of the Superior Court of Justice or a judge designated by the Chief Justice is satisfied, from the nature of the issues involved or the necessity for expedition, can and ought to be heard and determined by one judge."
Section 21 (2) was amended by 2025, c. 24, Sched. 7, s. 1, in force 2025-12-11, and that amendment did two things rather than one. It replaced "and" with "or" between the nature of the issues and the necessity for expedition, which is what makes the test disjunctive. It also inserted the words "or class of matters", which the version in force to 2025-12-10 did not contain. The second of those is the more consequential half, because a class designation is how a whole category of proceedings could be routed to a single judge without any party asking for it. Nothing published says a class has been designated. Older summaries of the subsection are worth checking rather than trusting.
Where the hearing happens is set by section 20 (1): an appeal to the Divisional Court "shall be heard in the region where the hearing or other process that led to the decision appealed from took place, unless the parties agree otherwise or the Chief Justice of the Superior Court of Justice orders otherwise because it is necessary to do so in the interests of justice." Two exits from the default region, and they are not equivalent. Agreement between the parties needs no order at all. The judicial route is not a bare interests-of-justice discretion: the four words "because it is necessary" make it a necessity test, and a different region merely being preferable will not meet it.
One thing to get right if you are drafting the notice yourself. It is section 210 (1) of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 that sends a Board order to the Divisional Court, and not section 19 of the Courts of Justice Act. Section 19 lists appeals from Superior Court judges, Family Court judges and associate judges, and it says nothing about tribunals. Rule 61.04 (3) (c) now requires a notice of appeal to state the basis for the court's jurisdiction, including the statutory provision establishing it, so citing the wrong one is a live problem rather than a pedantic one.
On judicial review the destination is the same court by a different provision. Section 6 (1) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act sends the application to the Divisional Court, and section 6 (2) allows it to be made "to the Superior Court of Justice with leave of a judge thereof", but only "where it is made to appear to the judge that the case is one of urgency and that the delay required for an application to the Divisional Court is likely to involve a failure of justice". Two conditions, both required, and leave on top of them.
More than the Board, and none of it appears on the Board's fee page.
The Board's forms, filing and fees page lists a Request to Review an Order at $58. It lists no appeal fee, no appeal form, and the word Divisional does not appear on that page at all. That is not an omission. An appeal is a court proceeding and the fee is a court fee. A request to amend an order carries no fee at all.
The court fees are set by section 1 (1) of O. Reg. 293/92 under the Administration of Justice Act, on a consolidation period running from 2025-12-19. Note its opening words, "The following fees are payable, except in respect of proceedings to which section 1.2 applies", which carves out proceedings governed by the Family Law Rules and does not touch either route on this page.
So the comparison is not the one you would guess from the headline figures. An appeal is $243 to start and $645 to perfect, and its stay arrives with the filing rather than with a motion. A judicial review is the same $243 and the same $645, and then, because there is no automatic stay, the motion under section 4 that you would need in order to hold enforcement is a further $339 under subparagraph 3 iv. On the fees alone judicial review is the costlier of the two court routes, and it is the one that starts without the protection.
Those figures move when that regulation moves, so read the formula rather than memorizing the number: the fee is whatever O. Reg. 293/92 says on the day you file. The $58 review fee, by contrast, sits on the Board's page, which also states that "LTB fees are non-refundable."
You can start both, and starting the second one suspends the first.
Nothing in section 209 or section 210 makes them mutually exclusive, and the Board's Rules contemplate the overlap directly. Rule 26.8 lists what a request to review must contain, and two of its ten items are about an appeal: subparagraph (i) requires you to "provide information about any appeal of the order", and subparagraph (j) requires you, "where there is an appeal of the order, indicate the requestor's position on whether the LTB should lift any stay resulting from the appeal". Rule 26.8.1 lets the Board refuse a request that does not comply with all of Rule 26, so those are not optional fields.
Guideline 8 then describes what the Board does with it: "Where an appeal or judicial review has been filed at the Divisional Court and there is a stay in place, the reviewing adjudicator will decide whether to lift any stay that may be in place in order to proceed with the review hearing."
The practical order therefore matters. The review deadline is the shorter of the two and it runs from the earlier event, so on the Cornwall example above it closes on 2026-10-22 while the appeal is open until 2026-11-12. If the review is the route you want, it has to be decided on first. Filing the appeal to protect the longer deadline is what then stops the Board proceeding on the review without deciding to lift the stay, so doing both is not free: it converts a review the Board could simply have heard into one it has to clear a stay to reach.
Four things on an appeal, plus whatever else it considers proper.
Section 210 (4) provides that if an appeal is brought, "the Divisional Court shall hear and determine the appeal and may, (a) affirm, rescind, amend or replace the decision or order; or (b) remit the matter to the Board with the opinion of the Divisional Court." Section 210 (5) adds that the Court "may also make any other order in relation to the matter that it considers proper and may make any order with respect to costs that it considers proper."
Read clause (b), because it is the outcome that is easiest to overlook. Remitting the matter sends it back to the Board with the Court's opinion on the law, and what happens next is another Board hearing. Winning an appeal on a point of law is not the same as winning the case, and on a remittal the facts are decided again by the tribunal that decided them the first time.
The plainer version of that is worth saying once. An order is not money, and neither is a successful appeal. If the order you are appealing was for arrears, the appeal decides whether the order stands; it does not put anything in your account, and the enforcement you paused by filing is the enforcement you will have to restart.
A Divisional Court decision is also not necessarily the end of it. Section 6 (1) (a) of the Courts of Justice Act provides that an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal from "an order of the Divisional Court, on a question that is not a question of fact alone, with leave of the Court of Appeal as provided in the rules of court". Leave is the gate, and the clock behind it is shorter than anything else on this page: Rule 61.03.1 (3) requires the notice of motion for leave to be served "within 15 days after the making of the order or decision from which leave to appeal is sought, unless a statute provides otherwise", and filed with proof of service in the Registrar's office "within five days after service". That is a fifth deadline sitting behind the four above, and it belongs on the diary the day a Divisional Court decision arrives.
Costs are at large in the court's discretion, and yes, the Board can appear against you.
Section 210 (5) gives the Court the costs power on an appeal, and section 131 (1) of the Courts of Justice Act is the general rule: "Subject to the provisions of an Act or rules of court, the costs of and incidental to a proceeding or a step in a proceeding are in the discretion of the court, and the court may determine by whom and to what extent the costs shall be paid." Keep the opening words. The discretion is not at large in the sense of unconstrained; it is constrained by any Act or rule that speaks to it.
That is a materially different exposure from the Board, where section 204 (2) lets the Board order a party to pay another party's costs and section 204 (4) requires the amount to be "determined in accordance with the Rules". A court costs award on a lost appeal is not bounded the same way.
Two provisions put the Board in the room. Section 210 (2) requires a person appealing to "give to the Board any documents relating to the appeal", and section 210 (3) entitles the Board "to be heard by counsel or otherwise upon the argument on any issue in an appeal". Section 211 goes further still: "The Board is entitled to appeal a decision of the Divisional Court on an appeal of a Board order as if the Board were a party to the appeal." That is a deeming provision rather than a grant of party status, it does not dispense with any leave requirement, and its practical effect is that beating the Board once does not necessarily end it.
Section 207 (7) is the last piece of the money picture and it is easy to miss: interest on money the Board orders accrues "only after" the date the Board sets, at the post-judgment rate under section 127 of the Courts of Justice Act. A stayed order is not accruing interest on some other basis while you appeal.
Then it is a different request, it goes back to the Board, it costs nothing, and reaching for the appeal spends the window on the route that would have worked.
The Board's brochure is called Amendments, Reviews and Appeals for a reason, and the amendment is the first of the three. Where an order contains a clerical mistake, a wrong unit number or a figure that does not match the reasons, the instrument is a request to amend, and the rule is Rule 24 of the Board's Rules of Procedure, titled Amending Orders. Rule 24.1 sets the window: a party to an order or any person directly affected by it may ask the Board to correct a clerical error in an order "within 30 days from the date the order or decision is issued". Rule 24.5 sets the contents, which is to say in writing, signed, with the file number, the address of the rental unit, member unit or residential complex, the requestor's contact details, and the amendment identified precisely. Rule 24.6 lets you ask for a stay pending the decision, in writing, identifying the prejudice. Interpretation Guideline 15 is Amending an Order, and the Board's Application and hearing process page confirms in terms that "There is no fee to make this request."
Two things follow that people get wrong. Rule 24.2 lets the Board amend an order on its own initiative without submissions or a hearing, so a slip you have spotted may already be in hand. And the 30 days in Rule 24.1 runs from issuance, which is the review's trigger rather than the appeal's, so on any given order the amendment window and the appeal window close on different days.
The matching exercise is worth doing deliberately before you file anything, because each route has its own window and they do not wait for each other. A slip in the order is an amendment under Rule 24, 30 days from issuance, no fee. An error in how the case was decided, within the closed grounds in O. Reg. 178/26, is a review at the Board, 15 days, $58, and one bite. An error of law is within those grounds too, at paragraph 2 of section 1 (3), so it is a review as well as an appeal, and the review is the shorter, cheaper and wider of the two. An appeal to the Divisional Court, 30 days from being given the order, is what remains when the review will not do, and it carries the section 25 (1) stay that a review does not.
Almost nothing on the court side, and it says so itself, which is more useful than an absence would be.
We looked again on 2026-09-09. There is no Interpretation Guideline on appeals: the published set runs 1 to 19 plus 21, with no Guideline 20, and none of them is about appealing. The Rules of Procedure never use the words Divisional Court at all, and mention an appeal in only three places, Rule 22.4 on reasons for an order under appeal and Rule 26.8 (i) and (j) on disclosing one. The forms page carries no appeal form and no appeal fee. The Application and hearing process page never uses the words judicial review.
What does exist is one section of the Amendments, Reviews and Appeals brochure, and it closes with this: "The LTB does not provide information regarding the Divisional Court appeal process. If you are planning to file an appeal, read the Guide to Appeals in Divisional Court and contact the Divisional Court or seek legal advice."
Take that at face value and plan around it. From the moment you decide to appeal, the Board is not your source, its counting rules do not apply to your deadline, its fee page does not have your fee on it, and its forms are not the forms you need. The notice of appeal is Form 61A.3 under Rule 61 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and a judicial review application to the Divisional Court is a notice of application in Form 68A under Rule 68. The appeal form number is the newer of the two: Rule 61.04 (1) was amended by O. Reg. 3/26, which is where Form 61A.3 comes from, while Rule 68.01 (1) carries no amendment later than 1999 and Form 68A is unchanged. So check the appeal form against the current Rules rather than reusing a precedent.
No, and that is unusual enough on this Act to be worth saying.
Sections 209, 210 and 211 sit in Part XII and they speak about "an order of the Board" rather than about a tenancy, a rental unit or a landlord. So they reach whatever the Board has ordered.
Three checks bear that out. Section 7 (1) disapplies a long list of provisions from social housing, and sections 209 to 211 are not on it. Part X, the mobile home park and land lease community rules we set out in what rules apply to a mobile home park or land lease community in Ontario, runs from section 152 to section 167, and not one of those sections touches the appeal route. And on a non-profit housing co-operative under Part V.1, section 94.16 maps a list of provisions across with necessary modifications precisely because those provisions are drafted around tenants and landlords; sections 209 to 211 need no such mapping, because an order of the Board is an order of the Board.
One qualifier on the co-operative point, because the Rules of Civil Procedure draw a distinction the Act does not. Rule 63.01 (3) (b) gives a separate automatic stay for a provision "terminating a member's occupancy of a member unit in a non-profit housing co-operative and evicting the member", alongside clause (a) for a tenancy agreement. So the appeal route is the same, and the stay provision names the two situations separately rather than leaving the second to be read into the first.
One neighbouring order is worth naming because it looks different and is not. A work order review under section 226 ends in an order of the Board like any other, so it is appealable on the same 30 days and the same question of law. We go through that route in what to do if you get a work order on an Ontario rental property. The municipal property standards order sitting behind it is a different instrument entirely and none of this page reaches it.
None of this is in the Act. It is process, and on a 15 day window it is what decides whether you had a choice.
One thing an owner should hear plainly. Of the four routes, the amendment is free and fixes only a slip, the review is $58 and reaches both law and fact but gives you one attempt and no stay you do not ask for, the appeal is $243 and $645 and confined to a question of law but carries the stay, and the judicial review is $243, $645 and a $339 motion for a ground narrower still. The appeal is also the slowest, since it goes to a panel of three judges rather than a paper review, and it is the only one that takes the question away from the body that decided it. Those are the trade-offs, and they are worth weighing against the amount actually in dispute before anybody files anything.
The diary you can run yourself. The appeal you should not.
Recording two dates off the face of an order, working four deadlines from their triggers and getting advice inside the shortest of them is administration, and an owner with one or two units can do it. This page is the substance of that step.
There is a separate question about who is allowed to stand up for you, and the Act does not answer it. The Board's Practice Direction on Representation before the Landlord and Tenant Board, effective 2022-03-03, says that a person who is not licensed by the Law Society of Ontario as a lawyer or paralegal "may not represent a party at an LTB proceeding unless that person falls within the specific licensing exemptions established by the LSO". Read the closing words rather than the first half, because the exemptions are the operative part. It then speaks to property managers by name: an unlicensed person seeking to represent a landlord on the basis that they are a property manager "may not be allowed to represent the landlord if they are in fact engaged in the business of providing legal services to multiple third parties and do not fall within one of the LSO exemptions". That is a two-limb test and both limbs have to be met before the door closes. Note also that the Practice Direction governs the Board, not the court, so it answers who can appear on the review and not who can appear on the appeal.
What follows the Board is not administration either. A notice of appeal now has to plead the basis for the court's jurisdiction, the ground is confined to a question of law, service, filing and perfection run on three separate clocks, the Board is entitled to appear against you, and costs in a court are not bounded the way the Board's are. That is a proceeding, and frankly the advice is that it is one to take to a lawyer or a licensed paralegal rather than to run off a template.
Where KEILTY earns its keep on a file like this is upstream. An appeal is confined to a question of law, so it cannot repair a hearing that went badly on the evidence, and the fix for that is a file assembled while the events were happening rather than the week before the hearing. Dated ledgers, served notices with proof of service, and a maintenance record that exists before anybody asks for it are what make an order go your way in the first place, which is cheaper than any of the four routes above. If you own a building and it is being run off the side of a desk, our small multi-family page sets out how we run it.
Holding an order you think is wrong and not sure which of the four routes fits it? Get in touch and we will work through the dates with you.
This post is general information about Ontario residential tenancy law as of 2026-09-12, not legal advice. Legislation, regulations and tribunal practice change. For advice on a specific property or situation, speak with a lawyer or licensed paralegal.
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