By A.J. Keilty, President, KEILTY Realty Management

If a fire inspector has handed you an order on an Ontario rental building, it is not a property standards order. It is not a work order under the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 either, and the Landlord and Tenant Board has nothing to do with it. It runs on a separate statute, the Fire Protection and Prevention Act, 1997, with its own forum, its own clock and its own penalties.
Your first move is probably not an appeal. The Fire Safety Commission hears appeals, and an order made by a fire chief cannot go there directly. It goes to the Fire Marshal for a review under section 25, and you have fifteen days from service to ask for it.
The short version.
To the Fire Marshal first and the Fire Safety Commission second, and the statute says so on the face of the order itself. Section 23 requires that an order made under subsection 21 (1) or (2) "shall set out, (a) the reasons for the order; (b) an explanation of the action required by the order; (c) the time within which the owner or occupant must comply with the order; and (d) the right to request a review of the order by the Fire Marshal under section 25 or, in the case of an order made by the Fire Marshal, the right of appeal to the Fire Safety Commission under section 26."
Read clause (d) slowly. It sets out two routes for two order makers. A Fire Marshal review is what you get when an inspector made the order, and an inspector, for the purposes of that Part of the Act, is defined by section 19 (1) as "the Fire Marshal, an assistant to the Fire Marshal or a fire chief".
An appeal to the Commission is what you get when the Fire Marshal made the order, or has finished reviewing another inspector's. If the order in your hand names the Commission and was signed by your local fire chief, it is telling you the wrong thing. Clause (d) is the provision to put in front of them.
Is this you? If you own a rental in Kingston or Eastern Ontario and would rather not handle this yourself, KEILTY Realty Management manages it for a flat monthly rate. Tell us about the property and A.J. Keilty will call you within 20 minutes in business hours.
Ontario has three separate pieces of paper that tell a rental owner to fix a building, and they are not interchangeable. We have written about the other two in which property standards order did you actually get and in what to do if you get a work order. Tell them apart by the statute named on the order and by the body it sends you to.
The Board's own form instructions draw the boundary from the other side. The L6 instructions say the application is for a municipal work order enforcing the provincial maintenance standards, and then: "You cannot file this application to request a review of any other type of work order (for example, a municipal work order which is enforcing municipal property standards by-laws)." A fire order is further outside that door again.
How far outside is worth measuring rather than asserting. We searched the whole text of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 on e-Laws on 2026-09-25. The string "fire" returns zero hits, in every case and in every compound, and so do "Fire Protection and Prevention", "Fire Marshal", "fire chief", "Fire Code" and "fire safety". The Act that governs your tenancy never mentions fire at all.
The traffic the other way is no heavier. The fire statute contains no occurrence of "Residential Tenancies", "Landlord and Tenant Board", "rental unit" or "property standards", and it uses the words "landlord" and "tenant" once each, in the same sentence, section 76: "No action shall be brought against any person in whose house or building or on whose land any fire accidentally begins, nor shall any recompense be made by that person for any damage suffered thereby; but no agreement between a landlord and tenant is defeated or made void by this Act." Read past the semicolon. The only thing the fire statute says about your lease is that it does not touch it.
Section 19 (1) defines an inspector for this purpose as the Fire Marshal, an assistant to the Fire Marshal, or a fire chief. Section 11 (1) lists who the assistants are, and clause (b) is the one worth knowing in rural Eastern Ontario: "the clerk of every municipality that does not have a fire department". In a township without a fire department, the municipal clerk holds the power to order structural work on your building.
The inspection that precedes the order needs no warrant. Section 19 (2) reads: "An inspector may, without a warrant, enter and inspect land and premises for the purposes of assessing fire safety." A warrant under section 20 becomes necessary only once entry has been refused or is expected to be refused. Do not read that as meaning force always needs a warrant. On an emergency entry under section 15, subsection (5) lets the person entering call on police officers and use force as necessary, with no warrant at all.
The order is drafted around a general power, not a list. Section 21 (1) lets an inspector who has carried out an inspection of the land or premises under section 19 or section 20 "order the owner or occupant of the land or premises to take any measure necessary to ensure fire safety on the land and premises and may for that purpose order the owner or occupant, ... (g) to remedy any contravention of the fire code." The seven lettered clauses are illustrations of that general power rather than limits on it, so do not read the order as confined to the items it happens to name.
Two points about service sit in section 24 and are easy to miss. Subsection (1) requires a copy "served upon the owner and any occupant of the land and premises", which is conjunctive: your tenants get it too.
Subsection (2) says how: "In the case of an order respecting a building that contains two or more units intended for separate occupancy, the order shall be deemed to be served upon the occupants of the building if a copy of the order is posted in a conspicuous place in or outside the building." A notice taped in the lobby serves every tenant, "two or more units" reaches a duplex, and taking it down without the approval of the Fire Marshal, an assistant to the Fire Marshal or a fire chief is an offence under section 29.
This is where the government's own publications disagree with each other, and the difference can cost you the review. The statute uses one word: section 25 (1) gives the review "within 15 days after the order is served", and section 26 (2) gives the appeal "within 15 days after the order is served". Both clocks run from service.
The Ministry of the Solicitor General page on fire safety legislation and Ontario's Fire Code, stamped as updated on 2025-11-20 when we read it on 2026-09-25, follows the statute: "The Fire Marshal must receive the request within 15 calendar days after the order is served."
The Fire Safety Commission's own page does not, and it does not agree with itself either. On the review step it says: "Before appealing to the FSC, an owner or occupant who disagrees with an inspection order must request a review by the Fire Marshal within 15 days of having been served with the order." A few paragraphs later, on the appeal step: "If you are appealing an inspection order of the Fire Marshal, or a review decision and order, or an order to pay costs, you must appeal to the FSC within 15 calendar days of receiving the order or review decision and order." The extension sentence on the same page goes back to service.
One page, three sentences, two triggers. That page carried no last updated stamp of any kind on 2026-09-25.
Our own view is that the statutory word governs and the clock runs from service. It is a reading of the provisions rather than something either publisher states outright, and the safe practice does not depend on resolving it: count from the earlier of the two dates.
Mail complicates it further. Section 77 (1) allows service personally, by regular letter mail, by electronic transmission, by fax or by another method allowing proof of receipt, and section 77 (2) then says: "Service by regular letter mail under subsection (1) shall be deemed to be received by the person on the fifth day after mailing unless the person establishes that the person did not, acting in good faith, through absence, accident, illness or other cause beyond the person’s control receive a copy until a later date than the deemed date of receipt."
So the Act deems a date of receipt for mail and sets the challenge clock by service, and it does not join the two up for you.
Worked through on an order about a triplex in Gananoque, handed to the owner on 2026-10-05: the review request is due 2026-10-20, and the outer limit for an extension application is 2026-11-04. Mailed on 2026-10-05 instead, the deemed date of receipt is 2026-10-10, a Saturday, and fifteen days on from that is 2026-10-25, a Sunday.
A deadline does not simply expire on a closed day, and the rule is in a different statute again. Section 46 of the Legislation Act, 2006 provides that "Every provision of this Part applies to every Act and regulation." Within that Part, section 89 (5) excludes the day of service from the count, and section 89 (1) provides that "Time limits that would otherwise expire on a holiday are extended to include the next day that is not a holiday." Paragraph 1 of subsection 88 (2) makes Sunday a holiday, and section 89 (2) extends a filing deadline that falls on a day the place for filing is not open during its regular hours of business.
On the mailed branch above, that Sunday runs on to Monday 2026-10-26. None of it is a reason to sit on the file. Work to the earlier date and file early.
Because section 26 (1) is narrower than its heading suggests: "Any person who considers himself or herself aggrieved by an order made by the Fire Marshal under subsection 21 (1) or (2) or section 25 may appeal the order to the Fire Safety Commission." An order made by a fire chief is not an order made by the Fire Marshal, so you cannot appeal it to the Commission.
What you have instead is section 25 (1): "A person who considers himself or herself aggrieved by an order made by an inspector, other than the Fire Marshal, under subsection 21 (1) or (2) may, within 15 days after the order is served, submit a written request to the Fire Marshal for a review of the order."
Three things about that review matter before you draft it. It is a paper exercise. Section 25 (5) says: "The Fire Marshal is not required to hold a hearing when conducting a review of an order under this section." The Solicitor General's page puts it plainly, "The review does not involve a scheduled hearing." It adds that either party may receive a call from the Fire Marshal delegate to clarify information submitted, so the file is not sealed once it is in. Write the request on the footing that everything you want considered is in it, and treat any call as a chance to clarify rather than to supplement.
The Fire Marshal can also decline to engage with it. Section 25 (4) (a) allows him to "refuse to consider the substance of the request and refer the matter to the Fire Safety Commission for a hearing under section 26". That is not a loss.
It is a route into the Commission on a fire chief's order that you could not take directly. And the review is not confined to the relief you asked for: section 25 (4) (b) lets the Fire Marshal "confirm, amend or rescind the order or make such other order as he or she deems appropriate".
One filing detail, and it is a warning to a reader who works from forms. The Commission's forms page gives its registrar's email and no fee. Its own appeal form, numbered 0421E and printed "0421E (2021/01)", nowhere mentions the fifteen day deadline, and the only date it captures is the date the order was issued, which is not what either clock runs from. An owner working from the form alone gets no warning of the clock at all.
Yes, automatically. For an owner given an unrealistic compliance date, this is the provision that does the work.
Section 25 (6): "An application made under subsection (1) for a review operates as a stay of the order pending the outcome of the review." Section 26 (7) does the same for the appeal: "An appeal under subsection (1) operates as a stay of the order pending the outcome of the appeal." Both were added in 2002, so older commentary on this Act has no stay in it.
The stay is not unconditional. Section 25 (7) lets the Fire Marshal, on the request of an inspector, "which may be made without notice, order that the stay of the order be lifted if, in his or her opinion, the action is necessary in the interest of public safety." Section 26 (8) gives the Commission a similar power and widens who may ask for it, to an inspector or the Fire Marshal. The stay holds on ordinary facts and evaporates on urgent ones, and you may not hear about it first.
Note where it runs out. Sections 25 (6) and 26 (7) cover the review and the Commission appeal. Section 27, the appeal to the Divisional Court, contains no stay at all, so once the Commission has ruled the order bites again while you are in court.
Both publishers are close to silent on this. The Solicitor General's page addresses the review stage alone: "You are not required to comply with the order while it is under review by the Fire Marshal until a decision is issued, however, there may be exceptions where necessary for public safety." The Commission's pages say nothing about a stay at either stage; we searched them on 2026-09-25 for "stay" and "suspend" and found neither word. The stay at the Commission stage exists because section 26 (7) says so, not because anybody has published it.
You are not finished, but the two routes are not equally forgiving, and the asymmetry is the sharpest practical point here. For the Fire Marshal review, section 25 (2) allows an extension where the Fire Marshal is satisfied that there are apparent grounds for granting relief and reasonable grounds for applying for the extension.
Section 25 (3) then sets the outer limit: "An application for an extension of time may be made either before or after the expiration of the time fixed in subsection (1) but shall be made within 30 days after a copy of the order under subsection 21 (1) or (2) is served." Thirty days from service and the statutory route is closed. There is no relief valve.
The mechanism is the one you would have used on time. The Office of the Fire Marshal's online Fire Marshal Review Application takes an application to extend the time as well as the review itself. The same form can be had by phone or at OFMEMReviews@ontario.ca. That page also notes that instructions for submitting an application are printed on the back of the order.
For the Commission appeal, section 26 (4) sets the same 30 day outer limit, and a 2023 amendment then added section 26 (4.1): "Despite subsection (4), an application for an extension of time may be made at any time following the 30 days referred to in subsection (4) if the Fire Safety Commission is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for accepting the application at that time." The marginal heading printed above that subsection is the single word "Same", which is the blandest possible label on a provision that overrides the one before it. A summary that reads only the headings drops it.
So a late owner holding a Fire Marshal's order has a way back in at any time on reasonable grounds. A late owner holding a fire chief's order, past day 30, does not. Be late on the appeal if you must, never on the review.
It costs nothing to file. The Commission's forms page states: "There is no fee to file an appeal or application with the FSC." A Landlord and Tenant Board review of a maintenance work order carries an application fee, which the L6 instructions say may be waived on financial eligibility, and the Divisional Court carries a larger one. The fire route is inexpensive to start.
Section 26 (6) sets out what it may do: "The Fire Safety Commission may confirm, amend or rescind the order of the Fire Marshal or make such other order as the Commission deems appropriate."
Procedurally the Commission runs on a rulebook it shares with two unrelated tribunals, the Licence Appeal Tribunal and the Animal Care Review Board, recording amendments effective 2026-01-01. Those Rules contain no appeal deadline, no reference to the Fire Protection and Prevention Act, 1997 and no provision about stays, so they will not tell you what this post is about. They do carry one thing the no-fee statement does not cover.
Rule 19 lets a party who says another party has acted unreasonably, frivolously, vexatiously or in bad faith ask the tribunal for costs, and Rules 19.5 and 19.6 set the factors and the amount. No filing fee is not the same as no cost exposure. The published process is a case conference first. The Commission says it will send a Notice of Case Conference within five business days of receiving the notice of appeal or application, and a hearing follows only if the parties do not resolve the issues.
One trap runs the wrong way. A person given an order to pay costs may require a hearing under section 36 (1) within 15 days after service. But section 36 (2) lets the official ask the Commission to amend the order by adding to it, so challenging a costs order can increase it.
Section 36 (3) also confines the Commission narrowly: it "shall consider only whether any of the costs specified in the order, (a) are unreasonable having regard to what was done;" or do not relate to a thing you were ordered to do or that the official was authorized to do. Whether the entry or the order was justified is not in front of it, and the Commission's page states that it cannot extend the 15 day limit for a costs appeal at all.
There is, and it is written into the Act, but it has an exception that swallows a good deal of it.
Section 22 (1): "No inspector shall make an order under clause 21 (1) (b) requiring structural repairs or alterations to a building, structure or premises that was constructed in compliance with the building code established under the Building Code Act, 1992 or under a predecessor to that Act and that continues to comply with that code as it existed at the time of construction, unless the order is necessary to ensure compliance with the provisions of the fire code relating to the retrofitting of existing buildings."
Quoting that provision short of "unless" reverses its meaning. The grandfathering is real, and it is confined to structural repairs and alterations ordered under clause 21 (1) (b). It switches off wherever the order is needed to bring the building into compliance with the retrofit provisions of the Fire Code.
Those provisions are Part 9 of Division B of O. Reg. 213/07, and for rental stock the relevant sections are 9.5. for buildings up to and including six storeys, 9.6. for buildings higher than six storeys and 9.8. for a detached, semi-detached or row house containing two residential units. That last one applies only where the building is three storeys or less in building height, its building area does not exceed 600 square metres, and either one unit sits above another or two side by side units share a common interior means of escape.
Article 9.1.2.2. carries two exemptions, and the first is the one a rental owner should check first. Sentence (1) provides that this Part does not apply to a building that contains a residential occupancy consisting of no more than one dwelling unit and no other major occupancy. A single-unit rental house sits outside Part 9 altogether.
Sentence (2) then provides: "Except for Article 9.4.5.5. and Section 9.7 and 9.9, this Part does not apply to a building or part of a building that satisfies the applicable fire safety requirements of the Building Code." If either applies, Part 9 is off, and with it goes the exception to section 22 (1).
Two further articles are routes to a cheaper outcome rather than arguments about liability. Article 9.1.1.3. deems a Part 9 requirement complied with where alternatives are approved that "will provide protection for life safety similar to the protection provided by compliance with the requirement", in the opinion of the Chief Fire Official.
Article 9.1.3.2. lets the Chief Fire Official extend the compliance time where compliance is not possible by the required date "because of a strike, material shortage or other circumstances beyond an owner’s control". A proposal under either is a different conversation from an appeal, and it goes to the Chief Fire Official rather than to a tribunal.
One provision stops you being caught between two regimes. Section 22 (2) deems repairs, alterations or installations carried out in compliance with a section 21 (1) order, or for the purposes of complying with the Fire Code, not to contravene the Building Code. Section 22 (3) then sends a copy of any such order to the chief building official, so the building department hears about it whether or not you tell them.
Considerably more than the property standards route. The general offence figures in sections 28 and 29 moved in 2019, so older comparisons of those understate them, while the daily fine for failing to comply with an order has stood since 2005.
Section 30 does the work: "Every person who fails to comply with an order made under section 21, 25 or 26 is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $20,000 for every day during which the default continues, and the imposition or payment of the fine does not relieve the person from complying with the order." There is no cap in the section, no distinction between an individual and a corporation, and the closing clause is the half that gets dropped: paying does not discharge the obligation.
The general offence provision sits alongside it. Under section 28 (3) an individual convicted of an offence under subsection (1) faces up to $50,000 for a first offence and $100,000 for a subsequent offence. Imprisonment of up to a year is available as well, or both. Under section 28 (4) a corporation faces up to $500,000 and $1,500,000.
Section 28 (5) reaches a director or officer who knows that the corporation is violating or has violated a provision of the Fire Code, with the same personal exposure. For a numbered company holding one building, that liability sits behind the corporate one. For the purposes of sections 28 and 29 only, section 27.1 makes an offence a subsequent offence if there has been any previous conviction under the Act or the regulations, whether or not on the same provision. It sets no limit on how old that conviction may be.
What does run out is the time to act. Section 30.1 bars a prosecution commenced more than one year after the facts on which it is based first came to somebody’s knowledge. That somebody is a firefighter employed in or appointed to the fire department of the municipality where the offence occurred, or the assistant to the Fire Marshal responsible for that area.
Section 30.2 (6) sets the same one year limit on imposing an administrative penalty, running from when the contravention first came to the knowledge of the prescribed authorized person. Neither is a calendar clock, because both start on knowledge rather than on the contravention.
There is also a newer route that involves no prosecution. Section 30.2, in force 2026-01-01, creates administrative penalties imposed by order, to a maximum of $10,000 for a contravention by an individual and $100,000 for a contravention by a person other than an individual, or such lesser amounts as may be prescribed. Subsection (5) allows one to be imposed alongside a fine for the same infraction.
Review goes to a prescribed reviewer within 30 days, the review stays the order, and subsection (14) makes the reviewer's decision final. The regime is new enough that the Act's current consolidation period begins on the day it commenced, so anything written from an older copy of the statute does not contain it.
You do, and it reaches you through your tax bill rather than through a lawsuit. The route starts at section 33, which lets an inspector apply to the Fire Safety Commission for an order authorizing him or her to cause the thing to be done.
The Commission may authorize it on any of four footings: the person has failed to comply, is not likely to comply promptly, is not likely to carry the order out competently, or asks for the inspector's assistance. A second limb has to be met as well: in the Commission's opinion, failure to do the thing would seriously endanger the health or safety of any person or the quality of the natural environment. The fourth route into the first limb is worth knowing, because an owner genuinely unable to do the work can ask for the inspector's assistance rather than simply default.
Section 35 (1) then lets the Fire Marshal, a fire chief or an assistant to the Fire Marshal issue an order to pay the costs incurred by the Province or a municipality. Its marginal heading attributes that power to the Fire Marshal alone and the text does not.
Section 38 turns the costs into a charge on the land. Subsection (3) is the operative one: "The amount of any expenses referred to in subsection (1) shall have priority lien status, as described in section 1 of the Municipal Act, 2001, or section 3 of the City of Toronto Act, 2006, as the case may be, and shall be added by the treasurer of the municipality to the tax roll." Priority lien status is defined in section 1 of the Municipal Act, 2001, and the amount is collected the way municipal taxes are, including by tax sale.
What that ranking means against a particular mortgage, and what if anything shows on title, are questions for that Act rather than for the fire statute. Put them to your lawyer before assuming the charge is invisible. In territory without municipal organization, section 39 routes the same recovery through the Provincial Land Tax Act, 2006.
Section 40 widens it in a way that is easy to miss: the amount recovered "shall include all expenses incurred in doing any thing in connection with the land or premises that the Fire Marshal, an assistant to the Fire Marshal or a fire chief was authorized to do under an order or authorization referred to in subsection 38 (1), whether or not the thing was done on the land or premises." Work done elsewhere, in connection with your building, still lands on your tax roll.
Yes, and it is the part of this that survives the stay.
Section 20 (1) of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 says: "A landlord is responsible for providing and maintaining a residential complex, including the rental units in it, in a good state of repair and fit for habitation and for complying with health, safety, housing and maintenance standards." That subsection carries no qualifier. It does not depend on whether a municipal by-law applies, and section 20 (2) keeps it alive even where the tenant knew about the problem before signing.
Paragraph 1 of subsection 29 (1) lets a tenant or former tenant apply for an order determining that the landlord has breached an obligation under subsection 20 (1) or section 161. Subsection 29 (2) limits that to one year. The year runs from the day the conduct occurred, not from the day any order was issued. We have set out how that application runs in what happens if a tenant files a T6 against you.
Section 30 (1) then gives the Board a wide menu, including terminating the tenancy, abating rent, ordering the work, and ordering the landlord to pay the tenant's reasonable out of pocket expenses arising from the breach. One provision cuts the other way and belongs in the same breath. Subsection 30 (2) requires the Board, in determining the remedy, to consider whether the tenant or former tenant advised the landlord of the alleged breaches before applying. A tenant who went straight to the Board without telling you is not in the same position as one who did.
The Board's Interpretation Guideline 5, printed 2018-12-15, names the fire code among the standards it will apply and then explains how an order like yours is treated as evidence: "If a notice of violation, work order or other order has been issued for this complex or unit, it represents a finding by a public official that the landlord has not complied with the standard." The landlord can dispute it, but must raise the dispute, file the document and bring evidence.
The Guideline then closes the argument an owner reaches for first: "The fact that the landlord has been given more time by another authority to rectify the problem does not mean that there is no problem."
It gives something back in the next breath, and a summary that stops at the previous sentence loses it. The same passage goes on to say this. Where the work order was the first way the landlord discovered the problem existed, the fact that the compliance period has not yet expired for a non-urgent item may indicate a different remedy than a long-standing problem that was ignored. It also records that a landlord may argue that action already taken by the public authority, such as prosecution of a provincial offence, should count as penalty enough.
So the stay you obtained under section 25 (6) protects you from the fire department. It does not stop a tenant running the same facts as a maintenance breach while your review is pending, and a fresh order on a non-urgent item is a different case from an ignored one.
It can, and it does not. Section 21 (2) contains two closure powers, and both open with a qualifier limiting who may use them: an inspector may act only "with the approval of the Fire Marshal and upon such terms and conditions as the Fire Marshal considers proper". A fire chief cannot close a building alone.
Clause (a) is an order that the owner or occupant close the premises. Clause (b) is different in kind: where the inspector is of the opinion that immediate closure is necessary for the immediate protection of persons and property, the inspector may "cause the land or premises to be closed immediately and persons on the premises to be removed and direct that the lands or premises remain closed and that the premises be vacated until such time as the corrective actions ordered under subsection (1) have been completed." That is self executing. There is no compliance period, and it is the only place in the Act the word "vacated" appears.
Section 15 is a separate power again, and it is not an order at all. Where the Fire Marshal, an assistant to the Fire Marshal or a fire chief has reasonable grounds to believe that a risk of fire poses an immediate threat to life, he or she may enter without a warrant. The powers on entry include removing persons, posting a fire watch, removing combustible material, eliminating ignition sources, installing temporary safeguards and making minor repairs.
The Act orders no one to do anything here, so there is nothing to review under section 25 or appeal under section 26. Notice to the owner comes afterwards under section 15 (2), and only if the owner's whereabouts in Ontario are known. The only route left is a costs hearing under section 36, where the Commission may not consider whether the entry was justified.
Section 24 (3) governs how a closure order is given: a copy is posted on the land or premises and served on the owner if the owner is in Ontario and his or her whereabouts are known.
As for the tenancy, the fire statute leaves it where it found it. Section 76 says that no agreement between a landlord and tenant is defeated or made void by the Act, and a closure order does not itself terminate a tenancy. The obligations in section 20 (1) of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 keep running against you while your building is shut.
Termination is a separate question, and it runs on the tenancy statute rather than on the fire statute. Section 19 of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, under the heading Frustrated contracts, provides: "The doctrine of frustration of contract and the Frustrated Contracts Act apply with respect to tenancy agreements." Whether an indefinite closure frustrates a particular tenancy turns on the facts and on how long the premises stay unusable. Put it to a lawyer early rather than assuming an answer either way.
The first week is about dates and paper, not about arguments. Seven things, in order.
A fire order is one of the few pieces of paper in Ontario rental management where the cheapest response and the best response are the same thing. The review carries no published fee and stays the order. The expensive mistake is the quiet one: reading the words "Fire Safety Commission" on the order, treating them as an instruction, and letting fifteen days go by.
Can the Landlord and Tenant Board review a fire order? No. Section 226 of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 is confined to an inspector's work order made under section 225 for a breach of the prescribed maintenance standards. The string "fire" does not appear anywhere in that Act. A fire order goes to the Fire Marshal and then to the Fire Safety Commission.
How long do I have to challenge a fire order? Fifteen days after the order is served, under section 25 (1) for a Fire Marshal review and section 26 (2) for an appeal. An extension application must be made within 30 days of service, although section 26 (4.1) lets the Commission accept a late one at any time on reasonable grounds.
Do I have to do the work while I am appealing? Not while the review or the appeal is running. Section 25 (6) and section 26 (7) each stay the order automatically. The stay can be lifted on a request made without notice where public safety requires it, and no stay applies once the matter reaches the Divisional Court.
What does it cost to appeal to the Fire Safety Commission? Nothing to file. The Commission states that there is no fee to file an appeal or application. It is not a costs-free forum, though: Rule 19 of its Rules of Procedure lets a party ask for costs against a party who has acted unreasonably, frivolously, vexatiously or in bad faith.
What happens if the fire department does the work instead of me? The cost comes back to you through the tax roll. Section 35 lets a costs order be issued, and section 38 (3) then gives the amount priority lien status and has the municipal treasurer add it to the tax roll.
Not sure which of these orders you are holding, or whether the clock has already started? Get in touch and we will read it with you.
This post is general information about Ontario residential tenancy law as of 2026-09-25, not legal advice. Legislation, regulations and tribunal practice change. For advice on a specific property or situation, speak with a lawyer or licensed paralegal.